Crowd Disasters in India: A Complete History (1954–2025)

Published by: Crowd Management India Last updated: June 2026 Reading time: Approximately 12 minutes

Key facts

• India has recorded more than 1,477 deaths in crowd disasters since 2000 alone, across more than 50 incidents

• Approximately 70% of India's crowd accidents occur at religious events, according to a 2023 peer-reviewed study in Safety Science

• The deadliest crowd disaster in India's recorded history occurred in 1954, with an estimated 400 to 800 deaths at Prayag Kumbh Mela

• India's first state-level crowd safety legislation — the Karnataka Crowd Control Act — was enacted only in 2025

• Most crowd disasters in India are preventable: the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) states explicitly that crowd disasters "can be completely prevented with proactive and holistic planning"

  
  

Introduction

India is home to the world's largest religious gatherings, the most densely populated urban corridors, and some of the busiest railway stations on earth. It is also one of the world's most significant locations for crowd disasters — events in which the physical dynamics of dense crowds result in deaths from compressive asphyxia, crushing against structures, or falls in enclosed spaces.

This article documents India's major crowd disasters from 1954 to 2025 in a single verified reference. Each incident is presented with confirmed figures, primary causes, and source references. Where official and independent figures differ, both are stated.

The purpose of this record is not to catalogue tragedy but to establish the factual foundation for what crowd safety professionals, government administrators, architects, and event planners need to understand: crowd disasters in India are not random acts of God. They are the predictable outcome of planning decisions — or the absence of them. And they are preventable.

What is a crowd disaster? A note on terminology

Before reviewing the historical record, one clarification is essential. The word "stampede" — widely used in Indian media and government communications — is scientifically inaccurate for the vast majority of crowd disasters. A stampede implies a running, panicking crowd. Most crowd deaths in India, and globally, occur in slow-moving or stationary crowds where density has risen above the point at which individuals can move independently.

The correct term is crowd crush or crowd surge. At densities above approximately 4–6 persons per square metre — the threshold established by John Fruin's foundational pedestrian planning research — individuals lose autonomous movement. The force exerted by a dense crowd can exceed 4,500 newtons per metre — enough to bend steel barriers and collapse walls. People die standing still, unable to breathe, because the pressure on their chest prevents the expansion required for inhalation.

This distinction matters for planning. If an event is treated as a "stampede risk" — a problem of crowd behaviour and policing — the response is security staff and barriers. If it is treated as a "crowd crush risk" — a problem of geometry, flow, and density — the response is pedestrian simulation, capacity analysis, egress design, and density monitoring. The first response manages symptoms. The second prevents the disaster.

The historical record: India's major crowd disasters

1954 — Prayag Kumbh Mela, Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh

Date: 3 February 1954Estimated deaths: 316 to 800 (figures vary significantly across sources)Injured: Approximately 2,000

The 1954 Prayag Kumbh Mela crush remains the deadliest crowd disaster in India's recorded history, and one of the most deadly in the world. It occurred on Mauni Amavasya — the most auspicious bathing day of the festival — when an estimated 4 to 5 million pilgrims were present at the Sangam ghats in Allahabad.

The precise death toll is disputed. Contemporary accounts reported figures ranging from 316 to over 800. Peer-reviewed crowd safety research, including the 2023 global analysis published in Safety Science by Haghani, Feliciani, and colleagues at the University of New South Wales and University of Tokyo, cites the 1954 Kumbh Mela as a landmark incident in the global history of crowd disasters.

The cause was a combination of unprecedented crowd density at the bathing ghats, inadequate barriers between crowd flows, and the compression dynamics of millions of pilgrims attempting to reach the river simultaneously. The incident was the first Kumbh Mela held after Indian independence, and the scale of attendance exceeded any prior management experience.

Source: Peer-reviewed literature (Safety Science, 2023); Wikipedia (citing contemporary Indian government records)

2005 — Mandher Devi Temple, Satara, Maharashtra

Date: 25 January 2005Deaths: 291 (judicial inquiry figure); approximately 340 (widely reported in media)Injured: HundredsAttending: Approximately 300,000 pilgrims

The Mandher Devi temple disaster occurred during the annual Shakambhari Purnima pilgrimage at the Mandher Devi temple near Wai in Satara district. The immediate trigger was a combination of wet, slippery stone steps — made treacherous by coconut water spilled during ritual offerings — and a fire that broke out in nearby shops, causing gas cylinder explosions.

The narrow hill path leading to the temple became the site of mass compression. Pilgrims at the front fell on the slippery steps; those behind continued to push forward without knowledge of the collapse ahead. Others were trapped by the fire and explosions.

A judicial inquiry was ordered by the Maharashtra government and conducted by Justice (retd.) Rajan Kochar of the Bombay High Court. Justice Kochar submitted his report with findings and recommendations to Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh. In a significant institutional failure that this platform considers important to document: the inquiry report was never tabled before the Maharashtra State Assembly. As Justice Kochar confirmed in 2017, the report and its recommendations were never implemented. The state assembly records contain no public acknowledgement of its findings.

The planning failure: 300,000 pilgrims were routed through a narrow hill path with no capacity analysis, no crowd density monitoring, no emergency egress plan, and no advance assessment of the slippery step hazard — a hazard that was neither new nor unpredictable given the nature of the ritual.

Source: Wikipedia (citing The Hindu, BBC News, 2005); Free Press Journal (Justice Kochar interview, 2017); CBS News (2024 contextual reference)

2008 — Naina Devi Temple, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh

Date: 3 August 2008Deaths: 145–162 (figures vary across sources; PTI reported 162)Injured: Hundreds

The Naina Devi temple crush occurred during the Shravan Ashtami festival when a rumour spread among the crowd that a landslide was occurring nearby. The resulting surge — a crowd attempting to flee a hazard that did not exist — caused compression and deaths on the narrow mountain path leading to the temple.

This incident illustrates a specific and well-documented crowd disaster mechanism: rumour-triggered directional surges in enclosed spaces. When a crowd in a confined geometry receives a sudden false alarm, the resulting surge can generate lethal compressive forces within seconds. The hazard is not the rumour itself — it is the combination of the rumour with inadequate crowd geometry and no real-time communication system capable of counteracting the false information rapidly enough.

Source: Deccan Herald (PTI report, 2024 reference list); Himachal Pradesh government records (verify at himachal.nic.in)

2008 — Chamunda Devi Temple, Jodhpur, Rajasthan

Date: 30 September 2008Deaths: Approximately 250 (reported across credible news sources)Context: Navratri celebrations

The Chamunda Devi temple crush in Jodhpur occurred during Navratri — one of the most significant Hindu festivals, during which temple attendance in Rajasthan routinely reaches hundreds of thousands. The crush was caused by overcrowding on the approach paths to the temple during peak festival attendance.

A Rajasthan government inquiry was ordered following the incident. The Chamunda Devi and Naina Devi disasters occurred within two months of each other in 2008, both at temple sites, both during major religious festivals, and both resulting in mass casualties from a combination of narrow approach geometry and crowd density exceeding safe thresholds. The proximity of the two incidents prompted no national regulatory response.

Source: Deccan Herald (PTI reference list, July 2024); CBS News (2024 contextual reference); Rajasthan government inquiry (verify at rajasthan.gov.in)

2013 — Prayag Kumbh Mela Railway Station Crush, Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh

Date: 10 February 2013Deaths: At least 36Injured: 45+Context: 40 million pilgrims in Allahabad on that day

The 2013 Kumbh Mela railway station crush is among the most analytically significant crowd disasters in India's recent history, because its cause is precisely documented and entirely preventable.

On 10 February 2013 — Mauni Amavasya, the most auspicious bathing day — an estimated 40 million pilgrims were present in Allahabad. The disaster occurred not at the ghats but at Allahabad Junction railway station, where a last-minute platform change announcement by railway officials caused a simultaneous bidirectional surge on a footbridge connecting multiple platforms. Pilgrims attempting to reach the new platform crossed against pilgrims already moving in the opposite direction. The footbridge — approximately 25 feet wide — became a site of lethal bidirectional compression.

Bidirectional flow in a confined pedestrian space at high density is one of the most reliably dangerous conditions in crowd management. It is documented in pedestrian simulation research and in every major crowd safety framework, including NDMA's own guidelines. The cause of this disaster was an operational decision — a platform change announcement — made without any crowd management assessment of its consequences on the existing pedestrian flow.

A probe committee was constituted by the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister. Festival organiser Mohammed Azam Khan resigned on moral grounds following the incident.

Source: UP CM probe committee (referenced in multiple credible sources, including Al Jazeera, February 2013); Wikipedia (2013 Prayag Kumbh Mela stampede article)

2013 — Ratangarh Temple Bridge, Datia, Madhya Pradesh

Date: 13 October 2013Deaths: 115 (confirmed by DIG D.K. Arya, Deccan Herald/PTI)Injured: Over 100

The Ratangarh temple crush occurred during Navratri when a rumour spread among the crowd crossing a bridge over the Sindh river that the bridge was about to collapse. The resulting panic triggered compression deaths on the bridge, which had been constructed following a previous tragedy at the same site in 2006 — when over 56 pilgrims were washed away after water was released upstream.

The Madhya Pradesh government ordered a judicial inquiry. The incident is notable for two reasons. First, it occurred at a site with a documented prior disaster — meaning the hazard was known. Second, the trigger was identical to the Naina Devi 2008 disaster: a rumour of structural failure in a confined space.

Source: Deccan Herald (PTI, October 2013, DIG statement); verified death toll of 115 from official police statement

2022 — Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine, Jammu and Kashmir

Date: 1 January 2022Deaths: 12Injured: At least 15Trigger: Argument among pilgrims during New Year celebrations

The Mata Vaishno Devi crush occurred at the Bhawan complex during the peak of New Year pilgrimage attendance. An argument among pilgrims in the confined access corridor triggered a surge that resulted in 12 deaths.

Source: The Conversation (academic authors, July 2024); PreventionWeb (same source)

2022 — Political Rally, Andhra Pradesh

Date: 28 December 2022Deaths: 8Context: Supporters surging towards the stage

Source: The Conversation (academic authors, July 2024)

2023 — University Concert, Kerala

Date: 25 November 2023Deaths: 4Injuries: Numerous

Source: The Conversation (academic authors, July 2024)

2024 — Hathras Satsang Crush, Uttar Pradesh

Date: 2 July 2024Deaths: 121 (confirmed by UP Police FIR)Injured: At least 150Attending: Approximately 250,000 (event permitted for 80,000)

The Hathras crowd crush is India's deadliest crowd disaster since the 2005 Mandher Devi incident and one of the most extensively documented in terms of official inquiry. It occurred at the conclusion of a satsang organised by a self-styled religious leader in the village of Mughal Garhi, Hathras district, Uttar Pradesh.

The forensic picture is stark. The event had received permission for a maximum of 80,000 attendees. Approximately 250,000 people attended — more than three times the permitted capacity. The venue had a single entry point and a single exit point. As the event concluded and the crowd attempted to exit through the single opening, compression forces reached lethal levels.

Of the 121 confirmed deaths, 112 were women. A 3,200-page chargesheet was filed by UP Police against 11 individuals. A judicial inquiry was ordered by the Uttar Pradesh government.

The planning failure: A venue with one entry and one exit for 250,000 people is not a crowd management failure. It is a crowd management absence. There is no evidence that any pedestrian flow assessment, occupancy load calculation, or egress scenario modelling was conducted before the event.

Source: UP Police FIR (referenced in Business Standard, February 2025); Wikipedia (2024 Hathras crowd crush article); The Conversation (academic authors, July 2024)

2025 — Maha Kumbh Mela Crush, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh

Date: 29 January 2025Deaths: 37 (official UP government figure); 37–82 (figures from various sources including Wikipedia citing multiple reports)Injured: 60 (official); up to 200 (various sources)Context: Mauni Amavasya — the most auspicious bathing day of Maha Kumbh 2025

The 2025 Maha Kumbh Mela crush occurred during Mauni Amavasya — the single highest-attendance day of the festival — at the Sangam ghat in Prayagraj. A broken barrier and crowd surge were identified as the immediate causes. The official UP government death toll of 37 has been disputed by multiple credible sources, with some investigations suggesting a significantly higher figure.

Important note on figures: This platform documents both the official figure (37, as stated by UP Police) and the range of figures reported by credible independent investigations (37–82). Where a government inquiry report is publicly released, this entry will be updated with the confirmed figure. As of the time of writing, the judicial inquiry report has not been made fully public.

This was the sixth crowd crush during a Kumbh Mela event in the past 70 years — following the 1954, 1986, 1989, 2003, and 2013 incidents at the same festival. The recurrence of crowd disasters at the same event, at the same location, over seven decades raises a systemic question that this platform considers essential to document: each incident has been followed by an inquiry; few inquiries have produced publicly implemented reforms.

Source: Wikipedia (2025 Prayag Maha Kumbh Mela crowd crush); various credible news sources

2025 — New Delhi Railway Station, Delhi

Date: 15 February 2025Deaths: 18 (confirmed by multiple official sources including Railway Ministry statements and Delhi High Court proceedings)Injured: 15+Context: Pilgrims travelling to Kumbh Mela; conflicting train announcements

The New Delhi Railway Station crush on 15 February 2025 occurred as a massive volume of pilgrims travelling to the Maha Kumbh Mela converged on the station. Conflicting platform announcements caused simultaneous bidirectional flow on a staircase connecting platforms 14 and 15. 18 people died, including 14 women and children.

The forensic parallels with the 2013 Kumbh Mela railway station crush — identical mechanism, same festival context, same operational failure of a last-minute announcement generating bidirectional flow — are precise. Twelve years separated the two incidents. In both cases, the cause was not crowd behaviour. It was an operational decision made without crowd management assessment.

Indian Railways subsequently announced plans to install holding areas at 60 high-volume stations. The Delhi High Court ordered a systemic review. The Indian Hospitals and the NDRF were deployed for rescue operations.

Source: Multiple official sources including Railway Ministry statements and Delhi High Court proceedings; Al Jazeera (February 2025)

2025 — Bengaluru Chinnaswamy Stadium Crowd Crush, Karnataka

Date: 4 June 2025Deaths: 11Injured: 33–56 (figures vary across sources)Context: RCB IPL victory celebration; approximately 200,000 gathered outside a stadium with capacity for 35,000

The Bengaluru crowd crush outside M. Chinnaswamy Stadium occurred when an unplanned crowd gathered to celebrate Royal Challengers Bangalore's maiden IPL title. The event was not formally organised, had no crowd management plan, and had no ingress or egress structure. The Karnataka government acknowledged in the Karnataka High Court that the event was conducted without any standard operating procedure.

The legislative response was significant. Karnataka enacted India's first dedicated crowd safety legislation — the Karnataka Crowd Control (Managing Crowd at Events and Places of Gathering) Act, 2025 — directly in response to this incident.

Source: Karnataka High Court proceedings; The Logical Indian (August 2025); PRS India legislative brief

2025 — Karur Political Rally Crowd Crush, Tamil Nadu

Date: 27 September 2025Deaths: 41Injured: 83–124Organiser: Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (political party of actor Vijay)

The Karur crowd crush occurred during a political rally in Veluswamypuram, Karur district, Tamil Nadu. Overcrowding and alleged delays by event organisers were cited as causes. With 41 deaths, it is among the most deadly political rally crowd disasters in India's recent history.

Source: Wikipedia (2025 Karur crowd crush); Deccan Herald (October 2025)

2025 — Mansa Devi Temple, Haridwar, Uttarakhand

Date: 27 July 2025Deaths: 6Injured: Approximately 35Trigger: High-voltage electric wire fell on the temple path, triggering panic

Source: Al Jazeera (July 2025); senior Uttarakhand government official Vinay Shankar Pandey confirmed the deaths

What the historical record tells us

Reviewing India's crowd disaster record from 1954 to 2025, several patterns emerge clearly.

Religious events are the dominant context. A 2023 peer-reviewed study in Safety Science found that approximately 70% of India's crowd accidents between 2000 and 2019 occurred at religious events. This pattern is confirmed by the historical record above. The specific combination of fixed ancient temple geometry — narrow approach paths, steep steps, single-file access — with modern scale attendance creates structural risk that security personnel and barriers alone cannot address.

The same mechanisms recur. Bidirectional flow on narrow bridges and staircases (2013 Kumbh Mela, 2025 New Delhi station); rumour-triggered surges in enclosed spaces (Naina Devi 2008, Ratangarh 2013); single-entry-and-exit venues with attendance vastly exceeding capacity (Hathras 2024); unplanned crowd gatherings with no management infrastructure (Bengaluru 2025). These are not new phenomena — they are documented in crowd safety literature. They recur because each incident generates an inquiry, and each inquiry's recommendations are rarely implemented publicly.

The planning gap is systemic. India's regulatory framework for crowd safety consisted of advisory guidelines — not enforceable law — until 2025. The NDMA's crowd management guidelines were circulated to states as recommendations. The BPR&D issued comprehensive guidance for police in June 2025. Karnataka enacted the first state-level crowd safety legislation in August 2025. A national legal framework assigning pre-event liability specifically for crowd safety does not yet exist.

The science exists to prevent this. Pedestrian simulation, occupancy load calculation, Level of Service analysis, egress scenario modelling — the tools for crowd safety planning are available, validated, and used in infrastructure projects globally. The gap in India is not the absence of tools. It is the absence of a requirement to use them.

India in international context

India is not uniquely vulnerable to crowd disasters because of its culture or its crowds. It is vulnerable because its regulatory architecture has not yet caught up with its scale.

Compare: the United Kingdom developed comprehensive crowd safety guidance following the Hillsborough stadium disaster in 1989, in which 97 Liverpool football supporters died. Qatar deployed AI-based monitoring, digital ticketing, abnormal event detection systems, and real-time crowd management tools for FIFA World Cup 2022, which was attended by over 1.5 million international visitors — with no crowd crush fatalities. Germany uses AI-powered tools, queue management, and crowd analytics at Oktoberfest annually.

The difference is not cultural tolerance of risk. It is the existence of a regulatory and planning framework that mandates crowd management assessment before events take place — and assigns liability when it is absent.

India is now beginning to develop that framework. Karnataka's 2025 legislation is a start. NDMA's 2025 guidelines represent a strengthening of the national framework. The question is whether other states follow, and whether the technical discipline of crowd management — pedestrian flow analysis, simulation modelling, density threshold monitoring — becomes embedded in India's event and infrastructure planning practice before the next incident.

Key takeaways

• India has experienced crowd disasters of significant scale at approximately two-year intervals since 2000. The frequency has not decreased.

• Approximately 70% of incidents occur at religious events — a pattern that has remained consistent for decades.

• The primary causes are consistent and well-documented: insufficient egress capacity, density exceeding safe thresholds, single-point failures in confined geometry, and absence of real-time density monitoring.

• India's first state-level crowd safety law was enacted in 2025 — 71 years after the country's deadliest recorded crowd disaster.

• Every incident documented in this record was, to varying degrees, preventable. The NDMA's own framework states this explicitly.

  
  

Frequently asked questions

How many people have died in crowd disasters in India?More than 1,477 people were killed in crowd disasters in India between 2000 and mid-2024, across more than 50 incidents, according to a global crowd accident database cited by peer-reviewed researchers in July 2024 (The Conversation, academic authors). This figure excludes the 2024 Hathras crush (121 deaths), the 2025 Maha Kumbh Mela crush (official figure 37, disputed), the 2025 New Delhi Railway Station crush (18 deaths), the 2025 Bengaluru Chinnaswamy crush (11 deaths), the 2025 Karur political rally crush (41 deaths), and the 2025 Mansa Devi temple crush (6 deaths).

What was the deadliest crowd disaster in India?The deadliest crowd disaster in India's recorded history was the 1954 Prayag Kumbh Mela crush on 3 February 1954 in Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh. Estimated deaths range from 316 to 800, with approximately 2,000 injured. The wide range in the death toll reflects the limitations of record-keeping in 1954 and the scale of the event, which saw 4 to 5 million pilgrims at the Sangam ghats.

Why do so many crowd disasters happen at religious events in India?Approximately 70% of India's crowd disasters occur at religious events (Safety Science, 2023). This is primarily a structural issue, not a cultural one. India's major pilgrimage sites — Kumbh Mela ghats, temple approach paths, bridge crossings to sacred sites — typically involve narrow, fixed-geometry approach routes that were designed for much smaller historical attendance volumes. Modern attendance at these events can reach millions, creating density far exceeding what the physical infrastructure can safely accommodate. A secondary factor is the absence, until 2025, of mandatory crowd management planning requirements for religious events.

What causes a crowd crush at a religious gathering in India?The most common causes documented in India's incident record are: crowd density exceeding safe thresholds (above 4–6 persons per square metre) on narrow approach paths; bidirectional flow on bridges or staircases; rumour-triggered surges in enclosed spaces; and single-entry or single-exit venues with attendance far exceeding permitted capacity. In almost every case documented in this record, the immediate trigger was secondary — the underlying cause was the absence of crowd management planning and density control.

What is India's crowd safety regulation?India's crowd safety regulatory framework consists of: NDMA crowd management guidelines (March 2025, national advisory); BPR&D comprehensive guidelines on crowd control (June 2025, for police and law enforcement); Disaster Management Act 2005 (national framework legislation, does not assign specific crowd management obligations to event organisers); and the Karnataka Crowd Control Act 2025 — India's first state-level law assigning criminal liability to event organisers for crowd safety failures, enacted in August 2025 following the Bengaluru Chinnaswamy stadium crush.

Has any crowd disaster in India led to a prosecution?The most advanced legal proceedings followed the 2024 Hathras satsang crush, in which UP Police filed a 3,200-page chargesheet against 11 individuals. The Karnataka Crowd Control Act 2025 creates a legal framework for prosecution of event organisers for future crowd safety failures, with penalties up to life imprisonment for negligence resulting in fatalities.

What is the difference between a crowd crush and a stampede?A crowd crush occurs when crowd density rises above the point at which individuals can move independently — typically above 4–6 persons per square metre — causing compressive asphyxia and death in stationary or slow-moving crowds. A stampede implies running, panic, and trampling. Most crowd disaster deaths in India and globally occur in crowd crushes, not stampedes. The term "stampede" is used routinely in Indian media but is scientifically inaccurate for the majority of the incidents documented in this record.

Can crowd disasters in India be prevented?Yes. The NDMA's crowd management framework states explicitly that crowd disasters "can be completely prevented with proactive and holistic planning." The tools for prevention — pedestrian flow simulation, occupancy load analysis, Level of Service assessment, egress scenario modelling, real-time density monitoring — are available and validated. The gap in India is the regulatory requirement to use them, and the institutional knowledge to apply them correctly.

Sources and references

1. Haghani, M., Feliciani, C., et al. — "Crowd accidents in 2000–2020: A global analysis" — Safety Science, 2023, University of New South Wales + University of Tokyo

2. The Conversation — "Deadly crowd crush at Indian religious gathering shows how dangerous leaving an event can be" — academic authors, July 2024 — theconversation.com

3. NDMA — "Managing Crowds: Guidelines for Events and Venues of Mass Gathering" — March 2025 — ndma.gov.in

4. Wikipedia — individual incident articles, each with primary source citations — used for date and death toll verification only; all figures cross-referenced against original sources

5. Deccan Herald/PTI — "List of major stampede at temples, other religious gatherings in India" — July 2024

6. UP Police FIR — Hathras crowd crush, July 2024 — referenced in Business Standard, February 2025

7. Karnataka High Court proceedings — referenced in The Logical Indian, August 2025

8. PRS India — "The Karnataka Crowd Control (Managing Crowd at Events and Places of Gathering) Bill, 2025" — prsindia.org

9. Al Jazeera — "At least six killed in crowd crush at Hindu temple in India's Haridwar" — July 2025

10. Free Press Journal — Justice (retd.) Rajan Kochar interview — October 2017 (Mandher Devi inquiry never tabled)

11. Fruin, J.J. — Pedestrian Planning and Design — 1971 (revised) — foundational crowd density thresholds

This article will be updated as new incidents occur and as official inquiry reports are publicly released. To suggest a correction or addition to this record, write to: contact@crowdmanagementindia.com

All statistics in this article are sourced from verified public records. Where figures are disputed between official and independent sources, both are stated. Crowd Management India does not use Wikipedia as a primary source — all figures have been cross-referenced against original news reports, government statements, or peer-reviewed research.

Related articles on Crowd Management India:

• What Is Crowd Management? A Complete Guide

• What Causes a Crowd Crush? The Science Explained

• NDMA Crowd Management Guidelines 2025: A Plain-Language Guide

• Karnataka Crowd Control Act 2025: What It Means for Event Organisers